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SHOULD MCMAHON BE REVISITED?*
Constantine N. Katsoris*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Norman S. Poser, in his article When ADR
Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitra-
tion, explores the opportunities and pitfalls of securities arbi-
tration.' Specifically, he points out that the arbitration of dis-
putes between customers and their stockbrokers are distinctly
different in several respects from normal commercial arbitra-
tions, in that: (i) these disputes are not among members of an
industry, but between a member of the securities industry and
an individual investor, who may be unsophisticated and
unknowledgeable about investment matters; (ii) the customer
usually plays no role in drafting or negotiating the clause of
the agreement containing the pre-dispute submission to arbi-
tration and, indeed, may even be unaware that the agreement
he or she has signed contains such a clause; (iii) the brokerage
firm normally acts as agent for and adviser to the customer,
who often relies upon its knowledge and expertise, thus creat-
" Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S.,
Fordham University, 1953; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1957; LL.M.,
New York University School of Law, 1963; Public Member of Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration ("SICA7) since its inception in 1977; Public Member of
National Arbitration Committee of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), 1975-1981; Public Arbitrator at New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
since 1971; Public Arbitrator at NASD since 1968; Arbitrator for First Judicial
Department in New York since 1972; Private Judge, Duke Law School's Private
Adjudication Center since 1989; Arbitrator at the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") since 1991.
One of the three Public Members originally appointed to SICA in 1977 was
Mortimer Goodman, Esq. He retired from SICA in 1989 after thirteen years of
dedicated, inspired and selfless service. Even after retirement he remained keenly
interested in the continuing issues facing the public investor. Mortimer Goodman
passed away in December 1993, and I would like to dedicate this article in tribute
of the memory of this pioneer in the area of securities arbitration.
1 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095 (1993).
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ing a fiduciary relationship between the two; and, (iv) broker-
age firms and their employees are compensated by a system of
commissions whereby they are paid only if the customer buys
or sells the investment.2
Because most securities disputes are now steered into
arbitration as a result of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,3 Professor Poser examines the issue of the fairness
of such arbitrations, particularly those held at Securities Regu-
latory Organizations ("SROs"). After a thorough analysis, he
concludes on an optimistic note about the continued future use
of arbitration as a means of resolving customer disputes with
their brokers.4
This Article seeks to justify Professor Poser's optimism by:
tracing the history of securities arbitration before McMahon;
pointing out the impact of the McMahon decision; outlining the
additional efforts made thereafter to improve the arbitration
process; examining current problems and issues; and, conclud-
ing that the process works well so long as the public is con-
vinced that should a controversy arise, it will be resolved on a
level playing field.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MCMAHON
The arbitration of securities disputes can be traced back to
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") in 1872.' Since that
time, numerous other SROs have established arbitration pro-
grams for the settlement of such disputes.6
Under the United States Arbitration Act ("Federal Arbitra-
tion Act" or "Arbitration Act"),7 agreements to arbitrate future
disputes are, in general, specifically enforceable.' Before 1987,
2 Id. at 1096.
3 482 U.S. 220 (1987); see infra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
Poser, supra note 1, at 1112.
PHILIP J. HOBLIN, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES
1-2 (1988).
6Id.
7 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
' Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: "[a] written provision in ... a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration, a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract." Id. § 2 (emphasis added). Because the Federal Arbitration
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however, there was an exception recognized for customers'
claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933' ("1933 Act" or
"Securities Act"). This exception resulted from the Supreme
Court's 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan," in which the Court
considered the conflict between the mandate of the Federal
Arbitration Act to arbitrate and the provisions in the Securi-
ties Act intended to protect the customer's rights. In essence,
the Wilko Court resolved this conflict in favor of the Securities
Act by concluding that Congress' desire to protect investors
would be served more effectively by holding unenforceable any
pre-dispute arbitration agreements relating to issues arising
under the 1933 Act."
Moreover, prior to 1987, most federal courts presumed that
the Wilko prohibition also extended to the Securities Exchange
Act of 193412 ("1934 Act" or "Exchange Act"). Thus, despite pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, federal courts refused to order
arbitration for customers' claims arising under the 1934 Act as
well. 13 This extension of the Wilko prohibition was especially
significant since the public brings most federal securities
claims against brokers under the 1934 Act. This occurs be-
cause, unlike the 1933 Act, which is concerned with the initial
distribution of securities, 4 the 1934 Act deals principally with
post-distribution trading."
Act applies to claims arising from transactions involving interstate commerce, id.,
and because securities dealings usually involve such transactions, state securities
claims, as well as those arising under the federal securities laws, are usually
arbitrable. See also NYSE Rules Compel Arbitration of Depository Receipts Dis-
putes, 4 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 203, 204 (1993).
15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
1 Id. at 434.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
13 See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 368-69 (1988).
" The Securities Act of 1933 provides for civil liability. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771,
77o (1982). The 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the initial distribution of
securities and requires full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities
sold to the public. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liabili-
ty-How Far Do We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 208-09 (1967).
"' Liability under the Exchange Act is generally founded upon either section
18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988) or the implied rights of action under section 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240,10b-5 (1993). Most 1934 Act investor
claims against brokers involve section 10(b) of the Act. Eugene 'W. Bell & Kenn K.
Fitzgerald, Mixed Arbitrable/Nonarbitrable Disputes, 16 REV. SEC. REG. 849, 851-
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In 1987, however, the Supreme Court held in Shearsoni-
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 6 that the Wilko exemp-
tion did not apply to 1934 Act claims. In addition, in 1989 the
Supreme Court undid the Wilko exception entirely in
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,"7
holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements would be up-
held, even as to issues arising under the 1933 Act. 8 Because
of the McMahon and Rodriquez decisions, most securities dis-
putes are now arbitrated pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Indeed, in the calendar year after McMahon, the
number of SRO arbitrations more than doubled over the cal-
endar year before McMahon.9 And, although McMahon was
clearly a landmark decision in the development of the process
by which securities disputes are resolved, an examination of
not only the events following McMahon, but also those preced-
ing it is necessary in order to better understand its full impact.
II. SECURITIES ARBITRATION BEFORE MCMAHON
Prior to 1976, most SROs had differing rules for the ad-
ministration of securities arbitration disputes." In June 1976,
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion") solicited comments from interested persons on the feasi-
bility of developing a "uniform system of dispute grievance
procedures for the adjudication of small claims."2' After con-
ducting a public forum at which written and oral comments
were received, the SEC's Office of Consumer Affairs issued a
report recommending the adoption of procedures for handling
investor disputes and the creation of a new entity to adminis-
ter the system.2
52 (1983); see Katsoris, supra note 14, at 214.
1'6 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
17 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
18 Id. at 483-85.
19 SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, SIXTH REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 4 (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter
SIXTH REPORT].
"o See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute,
53 FORDHAM L. REv. 279 (1984).
" Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,528, 9 SEC Docket 833, 834 (1976).
22 An Integrated Nationwide System in the Resolution of Investor Disputes,
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Before implementing the proposal for a new arbitration
forum, the Commission invited further public comment.23 In
response to this invitation, several SROs proposed the estab-
lishment of a securities industry task force to consider the
development of "a uniform arbitration code and the means for
establishing a more efficient, economic and appropriate mecha-
nism for resolving investor disputes involving small sums of
money."24 As a result of this suggestion, a Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") was established in April
1977, consisting of representatives of various SROs, the Secu-
rities Industry Association ("SIA")26 and the public." Since
that time, SICA has published seven Reports to the SEC out-
lining SICA's progress.
Once SICA had been established, the Commission invited
proposals from it to improve the methods for resolution of
investors' small claims.2" After holding numerous meetings
throughout the country, SICA developed a simplified arbitra-
tion procedure for resolving such small claims.29 Realizing,
however, that the development of a small claims procedure was
Exchange Act Release No. 12,974, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,807 (Nov. 15, 1976).
See id.
' See id.; see also SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
2' The following SROs were represented: the American ("ASE"), Boston ("BSE"),
Cincinnati ("CSE"), Midwest ("MSE"), New York ("NYSE"), Pacific ("PSE") and
Philadelphia ("PHSE") Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange
("CBOE"), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB") and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at
1.
29 Id. The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
27 Peter R. Celia, Jr., Esq., Mortimer Goodman, Esq. and the author have
served as Public Members of SICA since its creation in 1977. Id. In 1983, Justin
Klein, Esq., was added as the fourth Public Member of SICA. Id. Mortimer Good-
man did not seek re-appointment as a Public Member as of the end of 1989, and
a new public member, James Beckley, was appointed in his place. The current
Public Members' terms shall expire, one each year, beginning on December 31,
1993. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
419, 428 n.59 (1990). All new members will serve for four years and are eligible
for one additional four-year term. The Public Members whose terms are not expir-
ing will determine the appointment of new members, or reappointment. Id. The
appointment, or reappointment, may be vetoed by a two-thirds vote of the non-
public members of SICA. Id.
28 Implementation of an Investor Dispute System, Exchange Act Release No.
13,470, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 81,136, at 87,905
(Apr. 26, 1977).
29 SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
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only a first step, SICA then developed a more comprehensive
Uniform Code of Arbitration ("Uniform Code" or "Code") to
cover all securities claims."° In addition, SICA prepared a book-
let for prospective claimants ("Procedures Booklet"),3 ' explain-
ing procedures under the Code. To a large extent, the initial
Code incorporated and harmonized the rules of the various
SROs, and codified various procedures which the SROs had
followed, but had not specifically included in their existing
rules."
The original Code33 was adopted by the participating
SROs during 1979 and 1980."4 Between the time of its initial
adoption and the McMahon case, various revisions were made
to both the Code and the Procedures Booklet, which were re-
ported in the Third, Fourth and Fifth SICA Reports to the
SEC.3" Shortly after McMahon, the SEC and SICA discussed
a number of recommendations and suggestions for improving
SRO arbitration, leading to many of the changes to the Code
which are reflected in SICA's Sixth and Seventh Reports and
which are discussed hereafter.36 In addition, SICA also pre-
pared an Arbitrator's Manual which was designed to guide
arbitrators concerning their duties and responsibilities.37
To this date, SICA continues to meet in order to monitor
the performance of the Code in action, with a view towards
further fine-tuning and adjusting its provisions." In addition,
various guests are invited to SICA meetings, including repre-
sentatives from the SEC, who attend on a regular basis. To
date, nearly 50,000 cases have been filed with the participating
30 Id.
3' SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION PROCE-
DURES (1980) [hereinafter PROCEDURES BOOKLET].
32 See Katsoris, supra note 20, at 284.
3See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, SECOND REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION (1978)
[hereinafter SECOND REPORT].
31 SIXT REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. Once SICA adopts a new rule, each SRO
must then generally go back to its respective organization in order to get a rule
change, which is then usually submitted to the SEC for approval. Accordingly,
there is often a time lag between SICA approval and SRO action.
'5 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 428 n.59.
" See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 429-30.
s See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 464.
'8 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 430.
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SROs since the initial approval of the Uniform Code.3"
III. POST-MCMAHON EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SRO ARBITRATION
What is attractive about arbitration is that it is both expe-
ditious and economical. Although speed and economy are im-
portant, they must not be achieved at the expense of fairness.
Fairness, speed and economy, however, are not mutually exclu-
sive, because speed and, particularly, economy increase the
fairness to public investors who may not have the resources to
sustain the cost of a lengthy proceeding, or who may have only
very small claims. It is thus critical that the Code's rules facili-
tate and maintain these essential characteristics, for justice
unduly delayed, or made prohibitively costly, is justice denied.
This is hardly an insurmountable problem, for all three goals
can and should co-exist, with fairness being the paramount
consideration.
To maintain arbitration as an effective and attractive
alternative dispute resolution process, however, it became
necessary for SICA to provide safeguards to ensure a fair and
complete hearing without destroying the fabric of arbitration in
the process. Because such safeguards often slow the proceed-
ings down, the benefits of each new procedure must be
weighed against the resultant escalation of time and cost. It is
against this background that SICA adopted the original Arbi-
tration Code and continues to amend it to this day.
40
" See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, SEVENTH REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 28 (1990) [hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT]; see also Dave
Pettit, NASD, Awash in Arbitration Cases, Urges Investors to Turn to Mediation,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 1993, at B4.
"o See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 431. Similarly, the AAA created a task force
in 1991 consisting of members from the securities industry and the customers' bar
to update its rules for use in securities arbitration. These efforts led to the adop-
tion of amended AAA Securities Arbitration Rules which were effective as of May
1, 1993. See also George H. Friedman, The New Securities Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1993, at 23 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-819, 1990). The issue of
whether non-attorneys should represent parties at SRO arbitrations currently is
being discussed by SICA. See Michael Siconolfi, Plan To Bar Nonlawyer Advisers
in Investor Disputes is Debated, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1993, at Cl; SICA Seeks
Comments on Code Changes Clarifying Who May Assist Claimants, 25 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1350 (Oct. 8, 1993):
According to SICA the amendment being considered would allow a non-
1993] 1119
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A. Single Independent Forum
SICA has always been concerned with improving the im-
age of SRO arbitration as a speedy, economic and fair forum
for the resolution of securities disputes.4' To the extent possi-
ble, it has also been SICA's goal to achieve uniformity in the
SRO rules and consistency in their application." Moreover,
with the influx of more complicated cases, such as RICO and
1933 and 1934 Act claims, and with the implementation of
many of the post-McMahon changes to the Code, securities
arbitrations have generally increased both in duration and
cost.4" Such escalation of time and cost is of some concern to
attorney to represent a party in arbitration if the would-be representative
is: a friend, relative, or fellow employee; an officer or employee of a cor-
porate or partnership party; or a business adviser "not regularly in the
business of representing parties in arbitration." The proposed rule would
bar non-lawyers "who seek to represent claimants on a regular basis
from 'assisting' claimants," SICA noted. It said it proposed the rule out
of concern "that non-attorney 'advisors' may not be competent to deal
with the complex issues" that "occur more and more frequently in arbi-
tration proceedings." Such issues include choice of forum, measures of
damages, and post-decision rights and remedies, SICA stated. It added
that it also is concerned that there is no supervisory body authorized to
police such representatives, "nor are there ethical guidelines binding on
'advisors.'" By contrast, SICA noted, many states have a mechanism for
disciplining lawyers who commit ethical violations, and most attorneys
are required to have malpractice insurance. Finally, it said, parties to
arbitration that do not have legal counsel are not protected by the attor-
ney/client privilege. Thus, such parties "may be treated to the experience
of their advisor's being cross-examined on conversations they believed
privileged,'" according to SICA.
See also Kenneth N. Gilpin, Fighting it out Over Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1993, § 3, at 17 (Business). Indeed, some consumer groups and other arbitration
associations such as the AAA do not agree with such limitations on representation.
Id. If SICA ultimately does decide to implement the proposed rule regarding non-
lawyer representation in the overall interest of consumer protection, perhaps it
should also then permit an interested party the option of arbitrating the claim
elsewhere, such as the AAA. Such a suggestion would hardly appear radical, since
both the SEC and the SIA have previously urged that customers' agreements con-
taining arbitration clauses be expanded to include the AAA option. See Katsoris,
supra note 27, at 470.
4' See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 452.
42 Katsoris, supra note 27, at 452-53.
' See Self Regulatory Organization; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
% 84,414 (May 10, 1989); see also Philip J. Hoblin, The Case For a Single Secu-
rities and Commodities Arbitration Forum, COMMODITIES L. LETTER, Aug. 1989, at
3; Katsoris, supra note 27, at 472-77.
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SICA.
One possible means of achieving SICA's goals is the single
independent forum (hereinafter "separate" and "single indepen-
dent forum"). Long before McMahon, the Public Members of
SICA raised the subject of a single independent forum with
SEC oversight.' Indeed, SICA was seriously considering such
a forum before McMahon.45 However, because of the disen-
chantment of the SEC, the disagreement among the SROs and
the presence of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
as an alternative, the concept of a separate independent forum
remained dormant until after McMahon, when it received the
support of the SIA.46
The separate independent forum initially was considered
in order to still any suggestion that investors are compelled to
arbitrate securities claims "in a forum controlled by the securi-
ties industry."4" Since McMahon, however, an additional com-
pelling reason surfaced in favor of a separate independent
securities arbitration forum, namely the escalating aggregate
costs of arbitration to each of the separate SRO forums.48 This
is partly so because the more complicated and time-consuming
RICO and federal securities violations cases have now been
thrust into arbitration by the McMahon and Rodriquez deci-
sions.49 Moreover, administering the numerous post-McMahon
amendments to the Code has contributed to an explosion of
costs."0 In addition, the costs to the SROs are likely to in-
crease even more as a result of implementing the essential
" See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 472-73.
' Katsoris, supra note 27, at 473-73.
"See Unified Arbitration Forum Under Discussion, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR
1 (May 1988); see also Diana B. Henriques, Market Place, Single Arbitration Agen-
cy is Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at D8; SIA Seeks Formation of Arbitra-
tion Group, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1989, at A3A.
"' Shearson/American Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 261, (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The uniform opposition of investors to compel arbitra-
tion and the overwhelming support of the securities industry for the process sug-
gests that there must be some truth to the investors' belief that the securities
industry has an advantage in a forum under its own control."); see William
Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, § 3, at 8
(Business) ("tlhe [brokerage] houses basically like the present system because they
own the stacked deck").
" See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 473.
'9 Katsoris, supra note 27, at 473.
o Katsoris, supra note 27, at 473-74.
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programs, which will lead to an intensification of arbitrator
training and education.5'
For these reasons, SICA commissioned a study in 1990 to
examine the feasibility of using such a single forum to admin-
ister all arbitrations involving the securities industry.52 While
SICA concluded from that report that no material economies of
scale would result from a single forum, SICA nevertheless
decided that it would continue to explore alternative methods
of improving the governance and image of SRO arbitration.53
B. Class Actions
The use of class actions in SRO arbitrations is particularly
troublesome-especially in the area of class determination.54
After much debate and discussion, SICA added section 1(d) to
the Uniform Code, which specifically prohibits the submission
of a claim as a class action.55 This prohibition of class actions,
however, had no effect upon the consolidation or joinder of
claims, which are still specifically permitted by section 13(d) of
the Code.5" Moreover, the Code continues to permit claimants
to be eligible to join in a class action pending in Court despite
an agreement to arbitrate; but the claimants may file such
claims in arbitration only if they have elected not to partici-
pate in or have withdrawn from the class action.57
51 See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
52 See Henriques, supra note 46, at D8 ("The Securities Industry Association
has called on Wall Street to set up a single industrywide agency to handle the
arbitration of customer disputes, rather than continuing to maintain separate pro-
grams at various exchanges and at the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers."); see also SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 7.
" See Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The
Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 581 (1991).
5' See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 7.
See UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § l(d).
5 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 15-16.
5' See UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 1(d). It will be interesting to note, however, what
effect, if any, the recent case United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1993), will have upon the involuntary consolidation of securities disputes before
SROs arising from differing arbitration agreements. See Deborah Pines, Consolida-
tion of Arbitrations Invalidated, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1993, at 1.
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C. Six-Year Limitation
From the very beginning the Code provided that no dis-
pute, claim or controversy would be eligible for submission to
SRO arbitration if six years had elapsed since the occurrence
or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controver-
sy.5" This rule was inserted as a matter of SRO convenience to
weed out stale claims. It was never intended, however, to limit
or eradicate claimants' rights. Unfortunately, some courts have
interpreted this rule as substantive instead of merely proce-
dural, thus denying claimant's relief after the six years
elapsed.59
In order to eliminate such misunderstanding, SICA, at its
Spring 1993 meeting, amended section 4 by adding subdivi-
sions (b) and (c) which, in effect, provide that eligibility under
the six-year rule shall be made by the Director of Arbitration,
and that a determination of ineligibility thereunder shall not
constitute a bar to asserting the underlying claim in a judicial
forum, notwithstanding any existing pre-dispute arbitration
agreement.0
D. Adjournments
Since the hallmark of arbitration is speed and economy,
repeated and often unnecessary adjournments have plagued
SRO arbitration from early on. Indeed, prior to 1989, as many
as one-third of the cases heard had their first hearing date
adjourned after the panel had already been appointed.6' Fur-
thermore, even this first adjourned date is often subsequently
adjourned again one or more times before the first hearing is
ever held. 2
Quite often all of the parties agree to these adjournments.
Nevertheless, such adjournments still have a crippling 6ffect
See SECOND REPORT, supra note 33, at A-4.
' See Time Concerns: SRO Eligibility, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (1993).
6C This amendment was passed at the SICA meeting held in Washington, D.C.,
on April 21, 1993. See In Brief Timely Progress, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 11,
12. (May 1993).
61 See Constantine N. Katsoris, Adjournments, "The Arbitration Virus," 2 SEC.
ARB. COAMMENTATOR 1 (Jan. 1989).
" Id. at 2.
19931
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on the arbitration process. For example, arbitrators who have
already cleared the challenge and conflict processes must be
replaced because their schedules cannot accommodate the new
adjourned date.63 This generally causes additional delay be-
cause the SRO staff must find a replacement arbitrator or
arbitrators, who must then also clear the challenge and conflict
hurdles de novo.'
Thus, seemingly harmless adjournments undercut the two
advantages of arbitration-speed and economy. This is not to
suggest, however, that legitimate requests for adjournments
should not be granted. In fact, parties should be given the
benefit of the doubt in this regard. Yet, the practice of seem-
ingly granting automatic adjournments, even when both par-
ties consented, strained and undermined the legitimate goal of
keeping arbitration speedy, economical and fair.65
Originally, section 18 of the Code merely authorized arbi-
trators to grant adjournments.' But through a series of
amendments to section 18 both before and after McMahon, a
fee was often required if the adjournment was granted. Still
plagued by the effects of adjournments, however, SICA seem-
ingly overacted by once again amending section (b), which
presently provides that:
(b) Unless waived by the Director of Arbitration, a party requesting
an adjournment after arbitrators have been appointed shall deposit
a fee, equal to the initial deposit of forum fees for the first adjourn-
ment and twice the initial deposit of forum fees, not to exceed $1,000
for a second or subsequent adjournment requested by that party. If
the adjournment is not granted the deposit shall be refunded. If the
adjournment is granted, the arbitrators may direct the return of the
adjournment fee.'1
As presently phrased, the rule now makes payment of the
fee (unless waived by the Director of Arbitration) a condition
precedent to the seeking of the adjournment from the arbitra-
tors. Such a precondition could impose a severe hardship on
6 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
16 See SECOND REPORT, supra note 33, at A-8.
6' See UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 18(b) (emphasis added). The majority of the Pub-
lic Members of SICA did not support this amendment. Moreover, this change has
not been adopted by the NYSE. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 617(b), in N.Y.S.E.
Guide (CCH) § 2617 (1981).
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many public claimants, and should be rescinded."8
E. Collection Feature
Undue delay in the collection of an award can be injurious
to claimants, particularly to the small investor, who may have
a pressing need for the money. Indeed, SICA was concerned
that some dealers unnecessarily delayed payment of awards
issued against them. Accordingly, section 28 was amended
after McMahon, and presently provides: "(g) All monetary
awards shall be paid within thirty (30) days of receipt unless a
motion to vacate has been filed with a court of competent juris-
diction." 9 This payment requirement is a distinct advantage
over court-litigated awards, since the SRO generally has disci-
plinary authority over the dealer.7"
F. Record of Proceedings
The Uniform Code initially did not require a verbatim
recording of the arbitration proceedings, although most SROs
did so record.7' After McMahon, however, the Code was amend-
ed specifically to require that a stenographic record or tape
recording of all proceedings be kept.72 This flexibility as to the
method of recording takes into account the significant cost
differential between a stenographic record and a tape record-
ing. In a multi-sessioned proceeding spanning over a long peri-
od of time, however, the printed record is preferable, because it
c In an arbitration system spanning the entire country, obtaining such a waiv-
er from the Director of Arbitration in emergency circumstances may be problemat-
ic. Besides, for a claimant of few or depleted assets, requiring a deposit of such
up-front money could cause a severe hardship.
'9 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 20. Section 28(h) of the Uniform
Code also provides for interest on such awards. Id.
70 See SEC Approves NASD Rule Changes Promoting Compliance With Arbitra-
tion Awards, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 190 (Feb. 5, 1993); see also N.Y.
STOCK EXCH. R. 637, in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) § 2637 (1981). The AAA is now
seeking to extend similar disciplinary effect for AAA awards.
71 See SECOND REPORT, supra note 33, at A-9. Section 25 of the original Code
provided "uinless requested by the arbitrators or a party or parties to a dispute,
no record of an arbitration proceeding shall be kept." Id.
72 See UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 24 (1993). After McMahon, the original section 25
was renumbered 24 and amended to require that a stenographic record or tape
recording of all proceedings be kept. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
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more easily enables arbitrators to refresh their recollection of
past testimony.73
G. Pre-Hearing Disclosures and Procedures
Before McMahon, there was no established mechanism to
ensure that parties cooperate in document production. Thus,
some parties did not produce documents until the day of the
hearing. This forced the demanding party into the unenviable
choice of proceeding with the hearing without having an ade-
quate opportunity to examine the newly produced documents,
or of seeking a delay from arbitrators who had planned to start
the hearing on that designated day. Such delayed production
often resulted in trial by ambush. It became apparent after
McMahon that the time had arrived to codify the informal
practice of some SROs to get the arbitrators more involved in
discovery disputes before the first hearing. Accordingly, SICA
added specific provisions to section 20 of the Code relating to
pre-hearing conferences, and to document and information
production.74
Under these new provisions a request for documents or
information can be served as early as twenty business days
after service of the Statement of Claim. 5 If a party objects or
fails to honor a request, a pre-hearing conference may be called
to resolve the impasse.76 The best hope for preventing these
procedures from dragging out and unduly increasing the cost of
the arbitration-as often happens in court proceedings-is to
have experienced and knowledgeable arbitrators who will not
let such matters get out of hand.
Prior to the initial hearing date, section 20 also now re-
quires the parties to exchange witness lists and the documents
that they intend to use in their direct case." In addition, all
7 The new amended AAA Arbitration Code, supra note 40, still does not re-
quire a verbatim record of the proceedings. See also Constantine N. Katsoris, I
Won't Sit Without A Record, 3 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (Sept. 1990). In 1993
the author presided at a non-SRO arbitration at which no record was required to
be kept. Nevertheless, it is still his emphatic opinion that a verbatim record
should generally be required.
74 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
71 UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 20(b)(1); see SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 9-10.
76 UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 20(b)(4).
77 Id. § 20(c).
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parties to a dispute must now receive copies of any subpoenas
issued.78 Finally, although the Uniform Code omits any refer-
ence to pre-hearing depositions, the circumstances under which
such depositions are usually ordered by the arbitrators are
discussed in the SICA Arbitrator's Manual."
H. The Arbitrators
1. Selection
The task of achieving a fair arbitration format would be
incomplete without focusing on the quality and integrity of the
arbitrators who administer it. Indeed, even the slightest ap-
pearance that the deciding panels leaned toward the securities
industry would undermine the public's confidence in the pres-
ent system of securities arbitration. It is for this reason that
the selection of securities arbitrators has come under so much
scrutiny over the past few years.
Under the post-McMahon Code, arbitrators are more close-
ly scrutinized both as to ability and background." They are
carefully selected, classified and evaluated, and then are sub-
ject to challenge.81 Their awards are also subject to public scru-
78 Id. § 20(f).
79 SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR'S MAN-
UAL (1992) [hereinafter ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL].
Access to depositions should be granted to preserve the testimony of ill
or dying witnesses, or of persons who are unable or unwilling to travel
long distances for a hearing and may not otherwise be required to attend
the hearing, as well as to expedite large or complex cases, and in other
situations deemed appropriate by the arbitrator. Balanced against this
ability, however, is a traditional reservation about the overuse of deposi-
tions in arbitration.
The effective use of discovery tools such as depositions rests in the care-
ful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators. Care should be taken to
avoid unnecessary expense or burdens to the parties and to avoid unnec-
essary delay. It is appropriate for arbitrators to consider whether the
witness will be able to appear at the arbitration hearing, the necessity of
preserving the witness's testimony, and other factors that bear on the
efficiency and fairness of the proceeding.
Id. at 10.
so UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 11; see SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 7-8.
s UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 10; see SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 7. The SROs
have developed a system for evaluating the performance of arbitrators which in-
cludes input from their fellow arbitrators, the 'parties and the SRO staff. See Ed-
ward W. Morris, Jr., et al., Securities Arbitration at Self Regulatory Organizations:
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tiny, so that the parties can get a sense of each arbitrator's
voting record and leanings.8 2
The selection of arbitrators at SRO forums does not em-
ploy the so-called tri-partite selection system, by which each
party picks an arbitrator and the two appointees pick a
third.83 Instead, the SRO forums pick the arbitration pan-
els," but section 10 of the Code permits one peremptory chal-
lenge to the panel, and unlimited challenges for cause.8 5
Each SRO maintains a roster of individuals who are not
employees of the sponsoring organization but whose profes-
sional qualifications and experience qualify them for service as
arbitrators." The Uniform Code specifically provides that un-
less the public customer requests otherwise, the matter will be
arbitrated by a panel "at least a majority of whom shall not be
from the securities industry." In other words, the majority of
the panel must consist of public arbitrators.87 The original
Code, however, gave no significant guidance as to who quali-
fied to be a public arbitrator, and the original version of the
Procedures Booklet described public arbitrators only as "indi-
viduals who are neither associated with nor employed by a
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.-Administration and Procedures, in 7 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 135,
177 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 781, 1992).
8 Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28 requires that an award include summary
data, such as the description of the issues in controversy and the amounts claimed
and awarded. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 11; see also infra notes 112-14
and accompanying text; SEC Approves NASD Rule Change Making Arbitration
Awards Publicly Available, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1166 (Aug. 1993).
" See JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, NUT-
SHELL SERIES 152 (1st ed. 1992); see also Michael F. Hoellering, The Independence
of Party-Appointees, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1993, at 1.
84 Edward W. Morris, Jr., Arbitrator Assignment-The Case for Agency Selec-
tion, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 3 (Feb. 1989).
85 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 7.
88 See PROCEDURES BOOiLET, supra note 31, at 3.
87 UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 8; see SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 6-7. It has
been suggested that arbitration panels should consist only of public members. See
SIA NASAA Split Over Fairness of Securities Arbitration Procedures, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 870 (June 10, 1988); Seeking "Fairness" in Brokers' Disputes,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 26, 1988, at 10 (Business). The principal problem with
this suggestion is that eliminating all arbitrators affiliated with the securities
industry from the arbitration panels would also eliminate sources of invaluable
insight into the workings of the securities industry. In addition, the adoption of
such an exclusionary rule would undoubtedly be perceived by the industry as
stacking the deck in favor of the investors.
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broker-dealer or securities industry organization."' Indeed,
SICA initially left this test flexible so that the vast experience
of many needed and qualified persons would not be lost.
As time went on, however, it became apparent that the
category of public arbitrators had to be more clearly defined.
Accordingly, Guidelines for the Classification of Public Arbitra-
tors were added to the Procedures Booklet. 9 After McMahon,
SICA further tightened this classification by amending section
8 of the Code specifically to exclude as public arbitrators, inter
alia: (1) brokers and registered investment advisers and per-
sons who are retired from the securities industry; (2) persons
who had been employed in the industry in the past three
years; (3) professionals, i.e., attorneys or accountants who
devote 20% or more of their work efforts to securities industry
clients; and, (4) spouses of industry personnel.
In addition, section 11 of the Code requires each arbitrator
to disclose to the Director of Arbitration any circumstances
that might preclude such arbitrator from rendering an objec-
tive and impartial determination. To facilitate this process,
arbitrators now receive a copy of the Code of Ethics each time
they are assigned to a case in order to highlight the types of
disclosures required. For example, the Code of Ethics requires
that an arbitrator reveal any direct or indirect financial or
personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration, and any ex-
isting or past financial, business, professional, family or social
relationships, which are likely to affect impartiality or that
might reasonably create an appearance of bias.9'
2. Training
SICA's Procedures Booklet provides that arbitrators must
be impartial and knowledgeable about the areas in controver-
sy." Positive steps were taken after McMahon to ensure that
See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 31, at 3.
8' See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ARBITRATION, FIFTH REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 5 (1986) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT].
"o See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 6-7; see also Robert S. Clemente, Secu-
rities Arbitrator Training: Managing the Arbitration Process, 1 SEC. ARB. 91, 104
(1993).
91 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 7-8.
92 See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 31, at 3.
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arbitrators are able to live up to investors' high expectations.
In this regard the two largest SROs, the NASD and the NYSE,
regularly conduct arbitration training sessions and semi-
nars.9 3 In addition, arbitrator training also takes place in the
form of printed media. An informative newsletter specifically
dedicated to the subject of securities arbitration is already in
print and is being offered to NASD arbitrators at a discounted
price.94 Other publications dealing with arbitration are also
available.95 Another significant publication used for arbitrator
training has been SICA's Arbitrator's Manual, which was de-
veloped specifically to instruct arbitrators concerning their du-
ties and responsibilities."
Distinctions, of course, must be made between inexperi-
enced arbitrators and those who are eminently qualified. Yet,
even the most sophisticated arbitrator can always use some
sort of training to adjust to changing needs and circumstances.
For example, in 1991 the United States Supreme Court in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.97 concluded that
claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act could be subject to compulsory arbitration. Since Gilmer,
discrimination disputes are ending up in SRO arbitration with
greater frequency because of the presence of an arbitration
'9 See Deborah Masucci, Maintaining The Fairness of Arbitration, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES SEMINAR 144-45 (1989); Edward W. Mor-
ris, Jr., Arbitration at the New York Stock Exchange, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES SEMINAR 114 (1989); Deborah Masucci & Robert S.
Clemente, Securities Arbitration at Self-Regulatory Organizations: New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.-Administration
and Procedures, 7 SEC. ARB. 115, 130 (1993); see also SIXTH REPORT, supra note
19, at 2-3; Deborah Masucci & Edward W. Morris, Jr., Arbitration at the NASD
and the NYSE, in 1989 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 448 (PLI Seminar No. 437, 1989).
Moreover, after 1992, the AAA is requiring training for its arbitrators. 5 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR 18 (March 1993).
94 See SAC Welcomes Our New Arbitrator Subscribers!, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR 1 (March 1993). Indeed, the Securities Arbitration Commentator is adapting
part of its newsletter specifically to serve the needs of arbitrators. See 5 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR 17 (May 1993).
" See, e.g., BNA Alternate Dispute Resolution Report; BNA Securities Regula-
tion and Law Report.
"6 SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MAN-
UAL (1989); see also Masucci & Morris, supra note 93, at 47; ARBITRATOR'S MANU-
AL, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (Aug. 1989).
9 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also John P. Fuffaro & Maury B. Josephson, Enforc-
ing Arbitration Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 1992, at 3.
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clause in securities industry employment contracts. Yet, most
of the experienced securities arbitrators know precious little
about such discrimination disputes. To meet this need, the
NASD and the NYSE, in conjunction with the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, conducted a seminar in New
York City specifically on employment discrimination."
I. The Agreement to Arbitrate
SROs require by rule that their membership consent to
arbitrate disputes with their customers.99 Simply by belonging
to the SRO, its members agree to be bound by the SRO's
rules."' Consequently, customers of an SRO may compel a
member of an SRO to arbitrate; absent a written contract,
however, the member cannot compel the customer to arbi-
trate. 1' The standard arbitration clause "authorizes the cus-
tomer to elect the arbitration forum from a list of several orga-
nizations. If the customer does not elect the forum within five
days after receipt from the broker-dealer of a notification re-
questing such election, the broker-dealer becomes authorized to
make the election."
10 2
As a practical matter, the extent to which customers are
"required" to sign what can basically be described as a typical
industry-wide agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration
clause is a critical question. This is particularly so if "the cus-
tomer may be precluded from doing business with the broker-
dealer if he or she refuses to sign the agreement or the broker-
dealer is unwilling to accept any modification of its terms."' 3
" The seminar was held at the offices of the NASD at 33 Whitehall St. in
New York City on April 27, 1993. See John Racine, Discrimination Claims Rise,
But Are Arbitrators Ready? Critics Say There's No Guarantee Panel Will Under-
stand Issues, BOND BUYER, Apr. 29, 1993, at 6A. The NASD was recently disquali-
fied from arbitrating a sex discrimination and age discrimination lawsuit brought
against Charles Schwab & Co. because the company's chairman serves on the
NASD's governing board. Edward Felsenthal, Schwab Arbitration, WALL ST. J.,
June 3, 1993, at B2; see also Margaret A. Jacobs, Little Diversity Found on Panels
for Securities-Firm Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1994, at B3.
" See HOBLIN, supra note 5, at 2-3 to 2-4.
'oo Id. at 2-4.
101 Id.
12 Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 82,122, at 81,978 (July 2, 1979).
103 Id.
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It would appear that such agreements are largely in effect with
respect to margin, option and commodity accounts, and, to
lesser degree, cash accounts.'
In order to ensure that customers understand that they
are signing an agreement which includes an arbitration clause,
SICA added section 31 to the Code."0 5 It provides that any pre-
dispute arbitration clause be highlighted and immediately
preceded by certain disclosure language that describes arbi-
tration and its effect.0 6 This SICA rule also provides that im-
mediately preceding the signature line there shall be a state-
ment, that the agreement contains a pre-dispute arbitration
clause which shall be highlighted and separately initialled by
the customer. Despite SICA approval several years ago, no
SRO has approved this requirement as to separate initial-
ling."0 7 Consequently, such an initialling requirement does not
appear in any SRO arbitration rule or code. This is unfortu-
nate because separate initialling more clearly calls the arbi-
tration clause to the customer's attention, thus reducing the
amount of litigation based upon a customer's lack of awareness
of the clause."0 '
Regretfully, many of these arbitration clauses often in-
clude choice-of-law provisions which unsuspectingly steer a
customer into restrictions they may never have intended, such
as foreclosing their right to seek punitive damages." 9 Such
restrictions, which are not apparent on the face of the agree-
ment, should be discouraged."
0
J. Written Opinions and Appeals
The issue of whether written opinions should accompany
awards, and the extent to which awards should be reviewable,
104 See Ann C. Stansbury & Justin P. Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker
Disputes: A Summary of Development, 35 ARB. J. 30, 32 (Sept. 1980); see also C.
FLETCHER, DYNAMISM IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURES SEMINAR 14 (1989); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION, HOW INVESTORS FARE (1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
1 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 23.
1'0 SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 23.
107 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 452.
1 0 Katsoris, supra note 27, at 432.
109 See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 593-96.
" See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
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continues to be controversial.
1. Written Opinions
Prior to McMahon, section 29 basically required that all
awards must be in writing and signed by a majority of the
arbitrators, and provided that awards were deemed final and
not subject to review or appeal."' After McMahon, however,
SICA renumbered section 29 as section 28, and amended it to
require that any award also include summary data, such as a
description of the issues in controversy and the amounts
claimed and awarded."' This data must be made available to
the public in accordance with the policies of the sponsoring
SRO."' Indeed, an outside vendor is presently publishing such
awards."4
Even with these additional requirements, however, the
Code still falls short of requiring written opinions, although
arbitrators remain free to so author. At first blush, this may
appear to some as a deficiency in the Code, in that written
opinions would give insight as to the rationale for past awards,
thus helping the parties in formulating opinions about arbitra-
tors with a view to exercising their peremptory challenges."
5
Upon closer analysis, however, such benefits may be out-
weighed by the negative implications of requiring such opin-
ions. First of all, the opinions would not necessarily be binding
on or of any precedential value to other arbitration panels."'
Moreover, they would often be written by laymen, inexperi-
enced in expressing themselves in legal terms, particularly
since many claims are often vague, loosely put together and
not always clearly set forth. Requiring opinions might discour-
age many fine arbitrators-often busy, successful people who
serve at nominal cost-from serving." 7 Moreover, mandatory
1 See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 36-37.
112 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
113 SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
1.. See 2 SEC. ARB. COMENTATOR 6-7 (June 1989) (Award Reporter); see also 2
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 2-7 (Oct. 1989) (Award Reporter). Indeed, some awards
are being analyzed and commented upon. Id. at 8-10.
, Katsoris, supra note 53, at 446.
n" Katsoris, supra note 13, at 382.
117 Katsoris, supra note 13, at 382.
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written opinions would certainly slow down the rendering of
awards, for awards are often the basis of consensus." 8 Nor
would requiring written opinions necessarily enhance the
cause of fairness."9 Indeed, in some instances mandatory opin-
ions might even result in fewer awards in favor of claimants on
general equity grounds. 2 ' By the same token, instead of being
used as a window into the rationale of arbitrators, a written
opinion could be used as a platform and blueprint for many
more appeals, because it would identify targets, meaningful or
otherwise, for the losing party to attack. Appeals are both
costly and time consuming. Furthermore, arbitrators would
have to be compensated for the considerable additional time
often required to render such written opinions. Similarly, such
a requirement would also put additional pressure on the al-
ready strained staffs of the administering forum, as drafts of
written opinions would be circulated and recirculated among
the various arbitrators for corrections, redrafts and finaliza-
tion.' 2
1
Thus, looking at the issue in totality, requiring written
opinions of fact and law in all cases would delay and add to
the cost of arbitration, without greatly enhancing or improving
its operations. There should be an exception, however, if an
award includes relief for punitive damages. Not only should
such awards be separately stated, but they should also be
accompanied by an explanation of the award in order to assist
a reviewing court in assessing the propriety of such unique and
unusual punitive relief.
122
2. Review of the Award
The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is very
limited. "If the award is within the submission, and contains
... For example, suppose that there are three arbitrators, A, B & C, that they
found damages of $10,000, $20,000 and $30,000, respectively; and that they ulti-
mately agree on a $20,000 award. When they write the opinion, however, A bases
his award on unsuitability, B on churning, and C on unauthorized trading. Can A,
B and C issue an award for $20,000, even though they cannot, in a written opin-
ion, agree on the reasons? Moreover, would they?
1.9 Katsoris, supra note 13, at 383.
120 Katsoris, supra note 13, at 383.
121 Katsoris, supra note 13, at 383.
'" See infra notes 128-77 and accompanying text.
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the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair
hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for
error, either in law or fact."123 In fact, the typical grounds for
vacating an arbitration award are surprisingly uniform
throughout the United States, namely:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an
arbitrator and a party or his counsel affecting the
arbitrator's impartiality or appearance of impartiality.
(2) An arbitrator was corrupt.
(3) The arbitrators did not schedule or conduct the hearing
in a fair and judicious manner.
(4) The arbitrators granted relief that they were not autho-
rized to grant under the contract pursuant to which the
arbitration was held.124
In addition, although courts generally will not set aside an
award for a mistake of law, they will vacate where the arbitra-
tors acted in "manifest disregard" of the law."
Although SICA did consider broadening the scope of re-
view of securities arbitration awards, the proposal was rejected
as inimical to the simplicity and brevity of arbitration proce-
dures. 2' In the area of punitive damages, however, some sort
' Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
12 Arthur J. Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB.
J. 63, § 6.03, at 61 (1965).
" See Brian N. Smiley, Stockbroker-Customer Disputes: Making A Case For
Arbitration, 23 GA. B.J. 195 (1987). For an award to be vacated on this ground,
"[t]he error must have been.., readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
Although the bounds of this ground have never been defined, it clearly
means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the
law .... Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides
to ignore or pay no attention to it .... The governing law alleged to
have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and
clearly applicable. We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration
panel's award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or
applicability of laws urged upon it.
Id. at 933; Blue Bell, Inc. v. Western Glove Works Ltd., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3528 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1993), mot. for injunction denied, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13983 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993).
12. SICA did consider broadening the scope of review of securities arbitration
awards. See MORTIMER GOODMAN, PUBLIC MEMBER SECURITY INDUSTRY CONFER-
ENCE ON ARBITRATION, IN RESPECT OF A RIGHT OF REVIEW OF AN ARBITRATION
AWARD (filed with the SEC on Dec. 15, 1977); see Katsoris, supra note 20, at 291.
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of reviewability is justified, as will be more fully developed
hereafter.'27
K. Punitive Damages
"Punitive" or "exemplary" damages-those in excess of
compensatory damages s-are widely recognized in civil litiga-
tion. Such additional damages are generally accepted or reject-
ed on policy grounds, and are usually imposed to punish the
defendant and serve as a warning or example to others who
may commit similar outrageous acts in the future.'29 In justify-
ing this rationale of deterrence, most courts require a finding
of malice or some other comparable act."'
Although exemplary damages are punitive in nature, they
lack the Constitutional and other safeguards generally accom-
panying criminal penalties. 3' Furthermore, because of the
frequency and magnitude of punitive damages,'32 the validity
and propriety of such awards has come under increasing scru-
tiny by the courts, legislatures and legal scholars.'33 To whatev-
The proposal was rejected as inimical to the simplicity and brevity of arbitration
procedures. See UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 28b. It is also interesting to note that the
AAA does not encourage written opinions. See Robert Coulson, Securities Arbitra-
tion at the American Arbitration Association, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, at
696 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Court Handbook Series No. 650, 1989). But see
Stephen A. Hochman, Reasoned Awards: Arbitrations Should State Findings and
Conclusions or Explain or Give Reasons for Their Awards, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR 1, 9 (March 1993).
12 See infra notes 128-77 and accompanying text.
128 Compensatory damages are those allowed as a recompense for the injury
actually received. See 1 BOUVIERE'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
750 (3d rev. 1914) (emphasis added).
'29 See LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, §
2.1(c), at 23 (2d ed. 1989).
130 Id. § 2.2(a)(1), at 26. The rationale of deterrence is particularly justified
where the wrongdoer has received or expects to receive financial or other benefits
from his misconduct. Id. Moreover, punitive damages act as an incentive to
wronged parties to seek redress, because their compensatory damages may be
nominal in relation to the relative cost of litigation. Thus, without such incentive,
the wrongdoers' behavior would go unchecked to the detriment of society as a
whole. Id. § 2.2(c)(1), at 30-31.
131 See id. § 1.3(f), at 11.
13 See John C. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damag-
es, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Note, Punitive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence,
61 NEB. L. REV. 651 (1982); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts:
A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158 (1966).
1 See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 129, § 3.0, at 37.
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er extent punitive damages are awardable in courtroom litiga-
tion, however, they should be similarly permitted in arbitra-
tion. Since McMahon, many of the larger and more complicated
customer disputes are now being litigated in arbitration in-
stead of before judges and juries. Although the SROs did not
start making their awards public until after McMahon, it has
been reported that since 1987 over $20,000,000 in punitive
damages have been awarded in SRO and AAA securities arbi-
trations, with several of these awards having exceeded one
million dollars.134 Such awards have served to escalate the
simmering debate surrounding the authority to award punitive
damages through arbitration.
1. The Choice of Law Response
At the state level, courts have been unable to agree unani-
mously upon the availability of punitive damages in arbitra-
tion. Most notable in opposing such awards in arbitration is
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc.,"' which involved a dispute over the payment
of royalties. In a four-to-three decision, the court ruled that an
arbitrator lacked authority "to award punitive damages, even if
agreed upon by the parties.""' The majority reasoned:
If arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the useful-
ness of arbitration would be destroyed. It would become a trap for
the unwary given the eminently desirable freedom from judicial
overview of law and facts. It would mean that the scope of determi-
nation by arbitrators, by the license to award punitive damages,
would be both unpredictable and uncontrollable.'37
The Garrity holding takes on added significance because of the
preeminence of New York as a situs for arbitration"8 and the
frequent inclusion of a New York choice-of-law provision in
... See Punitive Award Survey, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 5, 8 (May 1993); see
also Barbara Franklin, Securities Arbitrations, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1993, at 5.
135 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
236 Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
13 Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
138 Nearly 30% of all SRO arbitrations are held in New York City. See Edward
W. Morris, Jr., & Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration at Self-Regulating Orga-
nizations: New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Deal-
ers-Administration and Procedures, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 219, 235
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 742, 1991).
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pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
The presence of choice-of-law clauses is particularly prob-
lematic in arbitrations subject to the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University,"9 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a California choice-of-law clause that
provided that the construction contract at issue would be gov-
erned by the law of "the place where the [piroject is locat-
ed."4 ° The Volt Court reasoned:
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of
procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforce-
ability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.
Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules
governing the conduct of arbitration-rules which are manifestly
designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process-simply does not
offend the rule of liberal construction... , nor does it offend any
other policy embodied in the FAA.'
Because many securities arbitration agreements contain a New
York choice-of-law clause, the effect of Volt regarding the
Garrity prohibition remains unclear and unsettling.
An expansive view of Volt takes the position that the opin-
ion "endorsed the right of the parties to contract to agree on its
terms and be bound thereby"' and, that "such contracts
could be enforced so long as there is not preemption.""' But,
a more restrictive interpretation reasons that Volt merely es-
tablished
a substance and procedure distinction, with parties agreeing only to
the application of the state's substantive law-unless it is stated to
the contrary. Thus, with respect to punitive damages, a standard
choice-of-law clause governed by the Federal Arbitration Act would
be designating only that part of the state's law necessary to deter-
mine whether the conduct merits the awarding of such damages, not
whether the arbitrators have the power to award them. 4
After McMahon, in order to prevent the insertion of re-
139 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
'40 Id. at 470.
141 Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
142 C. Evan Stewart, Punitive Damages In Arbitration: Fish or Cut Bait, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 21, 1991, at 5.
'43 Id. at 6.
144 Id. (emphasis added); see also Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows,
Punitive Damages Awards in Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 12, 1992, at 3.
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strictive clauses in customers' agreements, SICA added subdi-
vision (d) to section 31 of the Code which, inter alia, prohibits
any condition that "limits or contradicts the rules of any self-
regulatory organization, or limits the ability of a party to file
any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators
to make any award."45 Although this prohibition does not
specifically mention punitive damages, it clearly expresses a
strong distaste for restrictions in customers' agreements that
limit the claim or award rendered by the arbitrators.'46 In this
regard, choice-of-law provisions, which often appear in pre-
dispute arbitration agreements and mandate the law to be
applied in deciding the dispute, can be restrictive. This is par-
ticularly true where a choice-of-law provision subjects an inves-
tor to the law of a situs that has no true relationship to the
place where the business was conducted. 47
When a dispute persists between a customer and a broker,
the path to relief is generally arbitration or court litigation.
The choice, however, should only involve the differences in
procedure, not the quantum of relief sought. To saddle arbitra-
tion with the perception that it provides less relief than that
available in court would rekindle the suspicion that SRO arbi-
tration creates a deck stacked in favor of the securities indus-
try.
48
,5 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 12 (emphasis added).
..8 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 446. In view of the Volt decision, however, it
is uncertain what effect this amendment to section 31 of the Code-which prohib-
its any limitation upon the arbitrators' ability to make any award-will have upon
clauses prohibiting punitive damages.
" See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. Indeed, not only are New
York choice-of-law provisions common in brokerage house agreements, they even
appear in those of one or two houses not even headquartered in New York. See
Punitive Award Survey, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 2 (May 1993); see also Arbi-
trators Must Decide Whether Firm Misrepresented Choice of Law Provision, 25 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 820 (June 11, 1993).
1' See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 458; see also Franklin, supra note 134, at 5.
Recently, a committee of the New York County Lawyers' Association issued a
report calling on the State Legislature to overturn Garrity. See Law on Punitive
Damages in Arbitrations Urged, N.Y. L.J., July 27, 1993, at 1. But see SIA Oppos-
es N.Y. Lawyers Groups Push for Punitive Damages in N.Y. Arbitrations, 25 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1184 (Aug. 27, 1993).
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2. The Judicial Review Response
On the other hand, one way to prevent runaway punitive
damages awards by juries is reviewability. If, however, puni-
tive damages are allowed in arbitration but are not generally
reviewable, while those obtained in courtroom litigation are,
then the playing field in arbitration would tilt in favor of
claimants. Accordingly, along with providing similarity of re-
lief-i.e., allowing punitive awards in arbitration as they are in
courtroom litigation-the law should also provide for a similar
reviewability of such awards. Thus, in exchange for a uniform
nationwide rule permitting arbitrators to impose punitive dam-
ages in securities disputes, the punitive portion of any such
award generally should be reviewable. Such a broad rule of
appealability would not be too disruptive of arbitration's quest
for speed and economy, if limited solely to the punitive damage
portion.
149
If review of punitive awards is desirable, what form or
procedure would be preferable? Some have suggested bifurcat-
ed proceedings-that is, to try the punitive claim separately
before a judge or jury.' The delay, extra cost and possibility
for inconsistent or incompatible outcomes that could result
from such separate procedures are hardly the panacea for a
court system already clogged with too many other cases. 5' On
the other hand, letting the arbitrators decide the entire case,
and permitting only the punitive damage portion of the award
to be generally subject to judicial review, would be more effi-
cient and could serve to alleviate some of the apprehension
149 Indeed, punitive damages are an unusual sanction that, to date, are rela-
tively rarely granted by arbitrators in securities disputes. See Punitive Award
Survey, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 8 (May 1993).
15 See 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 4 (Jan. 1991); see also COMMERCIAL AND
FEDERAL LITIGATION SECTION OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT
ON PUNITIVE DAAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1990). Some commentators
have suggested "[p]rohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages under
any circumstances, but providing a procedure for a prevailing party in arbitration
to seek punitive damages in a subsequent court proceeding (which procedure might
be made available (a) generally, or (b) only if the parties expressly reference it in
their agreement)." Id. at 24. As to the undesirability of bifurcated proceedings
generally, see Constantine N. Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 3 (1986).
"I See George H. Friedman, Punitive Damages in Securities Cases, N.Y. L.J.,
May 2, 1991, at 3, 30; see also Katsoris, supra note 53, at 599.
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expressed by the Court in Garrity.152
To make such review meaningful, however, a record of the
proceedings must be kept; otherwise, later attempts to recon-
struct what occurred during the arbitration proceedings would
invariably result in an affidavit shoot-out.5 ' Similarly, puni-
tive awards should not only be in writing, but should also
explain the grounds for their issuance.'54 Only with these safe-
guards can a reviewing body understand the rationale of a
punitive award in order to judge its adequacy meaningfully.
3. The Securities Industry's Response
The securities industry, in contrast, argues against award-
ing any punitive damages on the grounds that the law has
already made sufficient provisions for deterrence and punish-
ment, which eliminates the need for exemplary damages.'55
Indeed, the industry contends that its heavy regulation at both
the federal and state levels, supplemented by the industry's
own self-regulating system,5 6 already constitutes a significant
and adequate deterrent by allowing for punishment of those
activities that contravene industry rules and regulations. 5 '
Accordingly, the securities industry takes the position that the
enforcement procedures resulting from such regulation
serve the needs of society to hold out as examples those who violate
the mores of the industry. This is done in a very public forum with
all of the due process safeguards and is a far better manner than
any private arbitration or, for that matter, private civil suit, could
,.2 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
13 See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 600; see also supra notes 71-73 and accom-
panying text.
.' See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 600. It is interesting to note that some
states are considering claiming a percentage of punitive awards issued in arbitra-
tion. See Douglas Wilson, Florida Wants Share of Arbitration Award, NATL L.J.,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 15.
,.5 For example, injunctive relief is available in equity to deter continued
wrongdoing. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 129, § 2.2(a)(2), at 28.
... Organizations such as the NASD, the NYSE and various other SROs act as
internal regulators of the securities industry. See supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
"7 See William J. Fitzpatrick, Address of the General Counsel of the Securities
Industry Association Before the New York County Lawyers Association (May 29,
1991) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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ever accomplish." 8
Needless to say, investors and their representatives do not
share this conclusion as to punitive damages.'
4. The Supreme Court's Response
The debate over whether to award punitive damages, how-
ever, is not limited to securities arbitration. Indeed, other
industries, businesses and professions have also wrestled with
the propriety and effects of punitive damage awards." ° As a
result, judges and scholars alike have been raising and debat-
ing fundamental questions in an attempt to determine when
and how punitive damages should be awarded. For example,
what are the guidelines for imposing such damages? When are
they justified? Even when justified, are they excessive, and do
they therefore defeat the punitive or deterrent effect that they
originally sought to accomplish? To date, no clear resolution is
in sight. Rather, it often appears as though the courts and
legislatures were creating a "Tower of Babel"'' by discussing
the issues in differing languages and dialects.
Especially troublesome in this whole area is the uncertain-
ty surrounding the excessiveness of punitive damage awards.
Indeed, a few years ago that very issue was vividly raised
before the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Haslip.6' In upholding a punitive dam-
158 Id.
I"9 See Stuart C. GOLDBERG, PIABA'S 1991 REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2 (1991) ("In the final analysis, securities arbitration
without the possibility of punitive damages being awarded in egregious cases,
would be no more effective in discouraging grossly fraudulent conduct than would
be a grand larceny auto theft statute that limited punishment upon conviction to
divestiture of the stolen car."); see also Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys.,
Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[P]unitive damages serve as an effective
deterrent to malicious or fraudulent conduct. Where such conduct could give rise
to punitive damages if proved in court, there is no compelling reason to prohibit a
party which proves the same conduct to a panel of arbitrators from recovering the
same damages."); Thomas Watterson, Vulnerability Fate of Widows and Widowers,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1991, at 20.
... See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 573.
161 Id. According to Genesis, Babel is a biblical city where the building of a
tower was interrupted by the confusion of languages. See Genesis 11:1-9; see also
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 122 (1989).
12 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
1142 [Vol. 59: 1113
SHOULD MCMAHON BE REVISITED?
age award, which was about four times the compensatory dam-
ages, the Court left undecided the extent to which "due pro-
cess" acts as a check on a jury's discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit."3 In a
dissenting opinion, however, Justice O'Connor pointed out that:
[Ulnlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that
matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme re-
sults that jar one's constitutional sensibilities .... We need not, and
indeed we cannot draw a mathematical straight line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable
that would fit every case. We can say, however, that general con-
cerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when
the case is tried to a jury properly enter the constitutional calcu-
lus. "'
The issue of excessiveness recently was again raised before
the United States Supreme Court in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Inc.'65 In that case, the compensatory dam-
ages were $19,000 and the punitive damages were $10,000,000,
a ratio exceeding 526 times the compensatory damag-
es 166-seemingly clearly capable of jarring one's "constitution-
al sensibilities." Yet, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court
upheld the award'67 and, unfortunately, shed little light on
this troubled area.161 Indeed, Justice O'Connor, who dissented
1" Although the jury award was not broken down, it appears that over 80% of
the more than one million dollar verdict was punitive in nature. Id. at 6 n.2; see
also Pacific Mutual Life v. Haslip: Supreme Court Refuses to Specify Due Process
Standards for Awarding Punitive Damages, 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 5 (Jan.
1991); Sanjit S. Shah, Note, Can Punitive Damages Withstand a Due Process Chal-
lenge After Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw and Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal?, 18 FORDHAM1 URB. L.J. 121 (1990).
16 499 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
16. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
1 See Debra Cassens Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt, ABA J., May 1993, at
88.
16 TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722-23. Apparently the plurality of the Court partly
justified the punitive award by comparing it to expected gain or potential harm. In
other words, the focus should not merely be on the $19,000 that claimant spent
fighting a frivolous lawsuit (actual damages), but on the approximately several
millions of dollars that claimant stood to lose had it not managed to defend itself
and preserve its right to royalties. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Again Rejects a
Limit on Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1993, at 8.
1 See Rick Ryder, TXO Production v. Alliance Resources: The Promise
Fades-Last Word on Punitive Damages? 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (June
1993); see also Joseph C. Sweeney, Supreme Court Again Rejects Constitutional
Limits on Punitive Damages, 10 LLOYDS MARITIME L. NEWSLETTER, 1-2 (July 1,
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in Haslip, again dissented in TXO, stating:
The plurality opinion erects not a single guidepost to help other
courts find their way through this area. Rather, quoting Haslip's
observation that there is no 'mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able,'.., the plurality abandons all pretense of providing instruc-
tion and moves directly into the specifics of this case.
I believe that the plurality errs not only in its result but also in
its approach. Our inability to discern a mathematical formula does
not liberate us altogether from our duty to provide guidance to
courts that, unlike this one, must address jury verdicts such as this
on a regular basis. On the contrary, the difficulty of the matter
imposes upon us a correspondingly greater obligation to provide the
most coherent explanation we can. I agree with the plurality that we
ought not adopt TXO's or respondents' suggested approach as a rigid
formula for determining the constitutionality of punitive damages
verdicts. But it does not follow that, in the course of deciding this
case, we should avoid offering even a clue as to our own.169
Although the TXO decision is not a securities case and does
not involve arbitration, it is directly concerned with the due
process limitations, both procedural and substantive, on puni-
tive damages awards.'7 ° Thus, between TXO's silence as to
guidelines, and Garrity's... prohibition regarding awardability,
the "Tower of Babel" lives on with respect to punitive awards
in securities arbitration. 72
In order to strengthen the hand of arbitrators in awarding
punitive damages, at its January 1992 meeting, SICA added
subdivision (h) to section 28 of the Uniform Code specifically to
provide that the "arbitrator(s) may grant any remedy or relief
that the arbitrator(s) deem just and equitable and that would
have been available in a court with jurisdiction over the mat-
ter."7 3 Unfortunately, no SRO board has yet approved this
change, no doubt due to the reported strong industry lobbying
by the SIA."
In the meantime, the NASD-grappling with SICA's man-
1993).
169 TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2731-32.
17. See generally Ryder, supra note 168.
171 See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
173 See UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 28(H); see also Punitive Damages-In Brief, 4 SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR 10, 14, 15 (Apr. 1992).
174 Id.
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date that arbitrators may grant any remedy or relief they
deem just and equitable' 7 -has undertaken to study a wide
variety of options as to how to handle punitive damages in
securities arbitrations, such as permitting the appealability of
punitive awards either internally within the arbitration pro-
cess or in court, or placing some sort of cap on punitive damag-
es, such as two or three times compensatory damages, etc."6
Certainly, the TXO decision does not make a resolution of this
problem any easier.'77
L. SICA is not Perfect
Once in a while, a rule slips through SICA which hopefully
will not survive a 19(b) filing. 7' Such a rule was recently ap-
proved by SICA at its January 1994 meeting where section 13
of the Uniform Code was amended by adding a new subdivi-
175 UNIF. COD OF ARB. § 28(h); see also supra notes 173-74 and accompanying
text.
171 See Punitives at NASD, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 11 (May 1993); NASD
Committee Readying Proposal to Address Punitive Damage Dispute, SEC. WK., Aug.
31, 1992, at 3; see also Frank D. Ormsten, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitra-
tions, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1993, at 1. As between reviewability of punitive arbitra-
tion awards by the courts or internally within the SRO system, the former ap-
pears preferable, because an internal procedure would be met with skepticism and
suspicion by the public. It is also interesting to note that in 1988, U.S. Represen-
tatives Boucher, Dingall and Markey supported legislation that would have ex-
pressly assured customers of the right to punitive damages in securities arbitra-
tion, but that provision was dropped from the bill. See Punitive Award Survey, 5
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (May 1993); see also Franklin, supra note 134, at 5.
177 See Ryder, supra note 168, at 1; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Questions Lin-
ger on Punitives and Evidence, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S4; NASD Takes
Punitive Damage Issue to SEC; Adopts SICA'S Six-Year Eligibility Plan, SEC. WK.,
July 26, 1993, at 1. Unfortunately, a judicial resolution does not seem imminent.
See Tony Mauro, The Shape of Business to Come, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at
S29.
Even when the Court tries to be helpful to business, as with its long-
standing effort to find something constitutionally wrong with high puni-
tive damages, it fizzles in failure. Asked at a recent 8th Circuit confer-
ence whether the Court would take another punitive-damages case this
term, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asked dejectedly, "Why take another
one and flap around again?"
Id.
17 Under § 19(b) of the 1934 Act, each self-regulatory organization shall file
with the SEC any proposed rule or change in the rules of such self-regulatory
organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Moreover, no such
"proposed rule change shall take effect unless approved by the Commission or
otherwise permitted in accordance with the provisions of this subsection." Id.
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sion (a) thereto.
The purpose behind the amendment (Attachment Rule)
was to curb a growing practice of attaching irrelevant and/or
extraneous materials to pleadings. Under the new rule, if one
of the parties objects to such attachments and the issue cannot
be resolved by the parties, the objectionable pleading shall be
delivered to the SRO's Director of Arbitration for a ruling on
the propriety of the attachments, and shall not be delivered to
the arbitrators until the Director's ruling has been complied
with. The rule specifically provides, however, that attachments
that are redacted may still be offered into evidence at the hear-
ing for the arbitrators' ruling. In this regard, the decision of
the Director regarding the attachments may not be used by
any party to support or oppose the admission of any disputed
document to the arbitrators at the hearing.
The theory behind the amendment was to prevent the
arbitrators from being infected by the poisoned fruit only dur-
ing the interim period before the hearing, since they would
probably see it at the hearing, if offered. Although the proposal
has some merit, we must remember the basic attributes of
arbitration are speed, economy, and fairness, both in fact and
appearance.'79 Thus, the proposed rule must be measured
against other alternatives or consequences that may arise or be
considered. First of all, it would appear that one could easily
circumvent the attachment procedure by simply putting high-
lighted excerpts and quotes of prospective attachments in the
body of the pleading. Is the Director or Arbitration next going
to be asked to search and destroy portions of the pleading
proper? Such a course would hardly be advisable.
To the extent possible, SROs should not be making sub-
stantive judgmental decisions because SROs are still perceived
by many as being a forum supported by the securities industry.
Thrusting SRO personnel into motion pleading practice would
only add to their suspicion. These types of decisions should be
left to the panel, the majority of whom are public members. "
Admittedly, arbitrators could make such decisions before the
first hearing, but even such a procedure would add some delay
and expense to the process.
179 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 430-31.
180 Katsoris, supra note 27, at 434-35.
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Furthermore, pleadings are not in evidence until so intro-
duced into the record at the first hearing. Even then, arbitra-
tors generally do not consider them for the truth or falsity of
their contents, but merely as the pleader's allegations. Accord-
ingly, any such objections to attachments could be expeditious-
ly handled at the first hearing session before the arbitrators.
In fact, when the pleadings go to the arbitrators, they could be
clearly marked to highlight that the attachments are objected
to. If arbitrators are incapable of handing so simple a task as
to expunge from their minds excludable evidence, then they
should not remain arbitrators. Moreover, although irrelevant
attachments to pleadings are troublesome, it has been this
author's experience that such attachments often have an addi-
tional, unintended effect-namely, they suggest a weakness in
the pleader's case.
When the Attachments Rule was presented to SICA at its
January 1994 meeting, it was enacted by the narrowest of
margins. Four SROs and the SIA voted for the Rule, two
SROs abstained, and all four of the Public Members voted
against it. When one further considers that there are 15 voting
members of SICA,8 2 and the Attachments Rule received only
five affirmative votes (1/3 of the membership), with total public
opposition, it can safely be said that this controversial rule
does not carry a persuasive mandate. Accordingly, for the rea-
sons expressed herein, this author respectfully suggests and
urges the SEC to reject this rule under the theory that one
does not seek to eliminate an annoying insect with an elephant
gun.
IV. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF SICA AND THE NEED FOR
UNIFORMITY
One of the principal reasons for the creation of SICA was
to establish a uniform system of SRO arbitration which would
gain the respect and confidence of the investing public.1
83
Since the Code's adoption, SRO arbitrations steadily increased,
... See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
s See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
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rising from 830 cases in 1980 to 2837 in 1986.1' In 1987, the
United States Supreme Court with its landmark decision in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon85 effectively
mandated thousands of securities disputes into SRO arbitra-
tion by holding that 1934 Act claims were arbitrable pursuant
to pre-dispute arbitration agreements." Indeed, in the year
after McMahon, SRO arbitrations more than doubled to 6097
cases in comparison to the 2837 filed in the year before
McMahon.187
It is noteworthy that in the majority opinion in McMahon,
Justice O'Connor reflected upon the previous "mistrust of arbi-
tration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953." 8' Similarly, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun
pointed out that:
It is true that arbitration procedures in the securities industry have
improved since Wilko's day. Of particular importance has been the
development of a code of arbitration by the Commission with the
assistance of representatives of the securities industry and the public.
See Uniform Code of Arbitration, Exch. C, Fifth Report of the Secu-
rities Industry Conference on Arbitration 29 (Apr. 1986) (Fifth SICA
Report).8 9
Furthermore, in discussing the importance of SICA's Uniform
Code, Justice Blackmun noted:
This Code has been used to harmonize the arbitration procedure
among the SROs. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a
Public Securities Dispute, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 279, 283-284 (1984)
(Katsoris). As the Commission explained: [T]his [Code] marks a
substantial improvement over the various arbitration procedures
currently being utilized by the securities industry and represents an
important step towards establishing a uniform system for resolving
investor complaints through arbitration. SEC Exchange Act Rel. No.
16390 (Nov. 30, 1979). 44 Fed. Reg. 70616, 70617."'
The significant impact of the Uniform Code upon SRO
arbitrations is unquestionable. The attributes of uniformity
and fairness are vital to this impact. Inconsistences among
184 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 28.
1K 482 U.S. 220 (1987); see also supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
187 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 28.
"' 482 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added).
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
18 Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 59. 1113
SHOULD MCMAHON BE REVISITED?
SRO codes leads to confusion and forum shopping, and often
constitute a trap for the unwary.'9' Unfortunately, not all sec-
tions of the Code have been adopted by the SROs. For exam-
ple, no SRO code has adopted the SICA requirement that the
pre-dispute arbitration clause be separately initialed. 92 Simi-
larly, no SRO has yet adopted SICA's rule, enacted over two
years ago, that arbitrators may grant "any relief they deem
just and equitable."9 '
These examples of inaction are unfortunate, because they
undermine SICAs efforts to achieve a level playing field. Even
worse, however, is when SROs affirmatively by-pass SICA and
seek rule changes on their own. This is particularly unfortu-
nate since through its Public Members, together with the
SEC's oversight of the SROs, SICA is a mechanism with which
most of the public seems comfortable. In this connection, the
Public Members of SICA have in the past welcomed,' and
continue to welcome,' comments and suggestions to improve
the SRO process.
Recently, the NASD, sua sponte, proposed to the SEC a
rule change (Offer Rule) that permits parties in arbitration
proceedings involving at least $250,000 in total damages to
make pre-hearing settlement offers.' 96 The proposed rule
change would expire after two years.'97 It would require par-
ties who reject such settlement offers to pay the offering
party's reasonable costs (including expert witness fees) and
attorneys fees incurred after the offer was made, if the award
granted in the arbitration was not more favorable to the reject-
ing party than the settlement offer.19 Although this proposal
on its face would seem to encourage settlements of large and
costly disputes, it was the unanimous conclusion of all of the
Public Members of SICA that, on balance, such a rule change
could have an unwelcome and decidedly coercive effect upon
191 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 452-54.
12 UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 31; see SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 39, at 23.
113 UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 28(h); see Punitive Damages-In Brief, supra note 173;
see also supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
11 See 3 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 9, 19 (Sept. 1990).
19 See Make The Connection!, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 7, at 18 (May 1993).
19 See Exchange Act Release No. 33,081 (Oct. 20, 1993).
197 Id.
199 Id.
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public claimants to settle because of the risk of being assessed
with excessive costs and attorneys fees of the opposing par-
ty.9 9 Moreover, since the threshold sum of $250,000 includes
19 See Public Members' Comment Letter (Comment Letter) to the SEC dated
November 16, 1993 (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review). This letter was sub-
mitted by Public Members Peter R. Cella, Justin P. Klein and the author. The
fourth public member, James E. Beckley, who also opposed the Offer Rule, re-
sponded to the SEC under separate cover:
The NASD's proposed amendment is modeled after rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a wholly different procedural system
than that in arbitration. The thorough and extensive disclosure required
under the federal rules (and as well the array of sanctions available and
often used against parties reluctant to make disclosure) are not available
in arbitration. Indeed the very limited sanctions provided for are rarely,
if ever utilized by arbitrators, in the not uncommon occurrence of indus-
try members refusing or otherwise evading disclosure.
Thus, the opportunity of a claimant to fully evaluate his or her
claims in arbitration is severely hampered. Without that opportunity a
claimant cannot possibly assess the basis, indeed the essential fairness of
an offer of award. To the contrary it is the industry respondent who
starts out in the arbitration process with all relevant documentation and
immediate access to the registered representative, branch managers, com-
pliance personnel and files, investigative and otherwise. The proposed
amendment would give respondents an unfair advantage in utilizing an
offer of award to negotiate unfairly from a position of strength. Further,
in our view, it would continue to encourage the tactic of refusing or
otherwise evading discovery requests.
The proposed amendment would also be coercive of claimants. The
federal rule provides only for costs in the event an offeree fails to prevail
after a rejection of an offer. The NASD proposal would include attorney's
fees, along with the myriad of other costs amongst which would be that
of experts. Industry attorneys and experts are compensated on a substan-
tial hourly fee basis that grows quickly. Such expenses are and have
been a cost of doing business for broker-dealers. The proposal would pro-
vide not only a recapture of these costs but a weapon against claimants
who having already lost substantial monies and would be threatened,
indeed fearful of the "penalty" they could incur for pursuing their claims.
One can envision circumstances where exorbitant industry litigation costs
would exceed a claim.
In addition to the foregoing deficiencies it must be pointed out that if
the proposal were adopted and aggressively utilized as we believe it
would, arbitration panels would be obliged to hold an additional bitterly
contested hearing to consider what constitutes reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees (including costs) for the purpose of assessment
against a claimant.
The threshold of $250,000.00 in the proposed amendment includes of
course all sums claimed as punitive damages. Thus the proposal has the
immediate probable effect of compelling claimants to reduce or eliminate
a punitive damage claim so as to avoid crossing the threshold and being
subjected to an offer of award. It would, if implemented, virtually elimi-
nate punitive damage claims.
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punitive damages, the proposed rule would have the additional
effect of "compelling claimants to reduce or eliminate a puni-
tive damage claim so as to avoid crossing the threshold and
being subjected to an offer of award."200
When a proposal similar to the Offer Rule was first raised
at a SICA meeting, it found virtually no support among the
other SICA members, which include the arbitration directors of
the SROs. Indeed, a recent article in Business Week de-
nounced the Offer Rule as adding "a new element of unfairness
to a system that already tilts toward brokers."20'
In addition, there recently appeared an announcement
that the NASD also will propose its own rule change dealing
with large and complex cases.0 2 Although at the present time
this author will not comment on the possible merits of this
latest proposal, he merely wishes to note this additional exam-
ple of go-it-alone rule changing.
Of even greater importance than the issue of whether the
SEC approves the two NASD proposed rule changes, however,
is the troublesome manner in which they are being submitted
for SEC approval. If the recent NASD lone-ranger approach is
heralding a new era of go-it-alone changes which by-pass
SICA, then the very integrity of and effectiveness of SICA is at
stake. Coincidentally, it has recently been suggested that,
because the Uniform Code was extensively updated after
McMahon, SICA's role has diminished, implying that like old
soldiers it should fade away."' The scenario then suggests
that in the interest of uniformity and economy that all the
SROs-other than the NASD-abandon their public arbitration
Id.
2C0) Id.
"' See Michael Schroeder, Wall Street Should Stop Playing The Bully, Bus.
WK., Dec. 20, 1993, at 92; see also NASAA opposes NASD Proposal on Arbitration
Settlement Offers, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 75 (Jan. 27, 1994); Richard Karp,
Wall Street's New Nightmare, BARRON'S, Feb. 21, 1994, at 15.
22 See NASD Will Propose Special Arbitration To Cover Some Cases, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 6, 1993, at A9A ('The special procedures have been approved by the
NASD board and, will be forwarded to the Securities and Exchange Commissibn
for its approval, said Mr. Curzon, who will draft the proposal for the SEC."); see
also NASD Proposal for Large Arbitrations Would Let Parties Decide Panel's Pay,
25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1662 (Dec. 10, 1993).
" See Letter from William J. Fitzpatrick, General Counsel of the SIA (Dec. 22,
1993) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review); see also Feedback, 4 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR 2, 6 (Feb. 1993).
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programs, leaving the public securities arbitration function
thereafter solely to the NASD.2 4 The suggestion is ludicrous
because SROs, by their very makeup, lack the structural inde-
pendence necessary to insure public confidence.0 5
Indeed, as the arbitrable issues expand (i.e., employment
issues), and as the stakes grow (i.e., larger awards and puni-
tive damage issues), the public will demand more and more
that the rules of the battle be set by an independent group. At
the recent Attachments Rule meeting, twenty-four specific
items were listed on SICA's agenda for discussion-hardly the
sign of a fading soldier. But even if its agenda items were to
diminish, SICA's very presence, like the cop on the beat, is at
least reassuring.
SICA's stabilizing influence, together with the SEC's over-
sight role, has reinjected investor confidence in the SRO arbi-
tration system. Just as the investing public is well served by
an independent Financial Accounting Standard Board ("FASB")
in the formulation of financial reporting rules (with similar
SEC oversight),"' so too is it well served by an independent
SICA in establishing and maintaining a level playing field
(with SEC oversight) should a controversy arise.
To eliminate SICA now either through a de jure disman-
tling,"' or by rendering it useless by de facto circumventing its
role in rulemaking,2 8 would be regrettable. Such a course even-
tually would undermine the public's confidence in the SRO pro-
cess itself, and rekindle-justifiably or not-the image of a
deck stacked in favor of the securities industry."9 Should that
204 Letter from Willaim J. Fitzpatrick, supra note 203.
205 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 472-77.
An independent forum entails exactly what it indicates-a forum indepen-
dent from actual, inferential, subtle, practical or any other kind of imag-
inable pressure. The forum should be independent of the industry, inde-
pendent of the plaintiffs bar, and other than the SEC's general oversight
role, independent of that regulatory body. Similarly, individual arbitrators
and the forum staff must be free from such influences or pressures.
Id. at 475.
204 See Katsoris, supra note 20, at 312 n.259.
207 See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
209 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in McMahon: "The uniform
opposition of investors to compelled arbitration and the overwhelming support of
the securities industry for the process suggest that there must be some truth to
the investors belief that the securities industry has an advantage in a forum un-
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event unfortunately occur, perhaps the McMahon decision
would have to be revisited, either judicially or legislatively.210
CONCLUSION
Because courts are furnished by the government itself,
many claimants consider them to be more neutral forums than
arbitrations conducted before SROs, which are perceived to be
supported by the securities industry itself."' Yet, after study-
ing nearly two thousand arbitration cases brought by consum-
ers against brokers in 1989-90, the General Accounting Office
("GAO"), which conducts investigations for Congress, found "no
indication of a pro industry bias" in decisions at industry spon-
sored forums." Indeed, the GAO also found that investors
won about sixty percent of their arbitration cases, with awards
also averaging about sixty percent of the amounts claimed."'
Thus, it would appear that the McMahon court's confidence in
arbitration so far has been justified."4
Professor Poser's conclusion as to the viability of securities
arbitration is indeed welcome news. The alternative of throw-
ing thousands of cases back to congested court calendars is
certainly not the answer. In such a scenario, the securities
industry would be plagued by excessive litigation costs, which
either directly or indirectly would be borne by the public as the
industry's cost of doing business. In addition, the public would
often be denied justice because of the excessive costs and de-
lays associated with courtroom litigation."5 Yet, although Pro-
der its own control." 482 U.S. at 261 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1987, § 3, at 8
(quoting statement of Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman, American Bar Association Task
Force on Securities Arbitration: "The houses basically like the present system be-
cause they own the stacked deck")).
210 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text; see also Constantine N.
Katsoris, SICA Does the Bell Toll for Thee?, 6 SEC. AR. COmmENTATOR 1, 1 (Jan.
1994).
211 See Katsoris, supra note 27, at 452-53.
212 See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 7; see also Michael McGowan, See You
in Arbitration, ABA J., May 1993, at 110.
213 See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 7.
211 See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
211 See Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice
Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al ('We're becoming drug courts,' says
Edward R. Becker, a Federal appeals judge in Philadelphia .... , The short of it
is that we're getting an enormous volume of drug cases, and its making it very
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fessor Poser's optimism is well founded, the process will work
only so long as the playing field'remains level for all. Vigi-
lance, therefore, must constantly be exercised in order to main-
tain such equilibrium and confidence.216 In this regard:
To insure ... public investment we must retain the public's confi-
dence-confidence in the markets themselves and confidence that
should a dispute arise, it will be fairly resolved. This confidence,
however, can only be earned by maintaining a de facto as well as a
de jure image of fairness. In other words, the procedural rules must
be fair and the administration of the forum must be objective and
independent.21" '
Notably looking out for the public investors' interests are SICA
and the SEC, which maintains oversight of the SRO operations
and is a frequent guest at SICA meetings. In addition, SICA
has issued Seven Reports to the SEC regarding its activities,
and the Eighth is now being prepared. Moreover, in the past
the Public Members of SICA have welcomed,218 and continue
to welcome,"' comments and suggestions to improve the SRO
process.
In the final analysis, however, one can never become com-
placent and feel as though we have achieved the perfect sys-
tem, for in a less than perfect world, "[I]aws and institutions
are constantly tending to gravitate. Like clocks, they must be
occasionally cleansed, and wound up, and set to true time."22
difficult in many jurisdictions to hear civil cases.'"); see also Tim Smart, The Fed-
eral Courts Have a Drug Problem, BUS. WK., Mar. 26, 1990, at 76; Usa Wein,
Drastic Moves Urged to Ease U.S. Court's Load, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at B5.
Indeed, in California, the Los Angeles County Bar Association filed suit in federal
court to appoint more state court judges because it takes about five years for a
civil case to come to trial. See Paul Marcotte, LA. County Bar Sues California,
A.B.A. J., 28 (1988); see also Lawsuits in Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
1987, at B6; Marianne Lavell, Congress Now Considering Dispute Resolution Mea-
sures, NATL L.J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 1; Arthur L. Penzel, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Offers Solution to Overwhelming Caseloads, N.Y. L.J., May 3, 1993, at 58;
Randall Samborn, In Courts: Caseloads Still Rise, NA'L L.J., July 5, 1993, at 10.
216 See Statement of Constantine N. Katsoris before The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Dec. 8, 1977) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
217 Id.
218 See Make the Connection!, 3 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 19 (Sept. 1990).
219 See Make the Connection!, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 18 (May 1993).
21 HENRY WARD BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (1858).
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